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Introduction 
Courts have described patents as property rights in terms evoking 
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause for nearly 200 years.1 To date, 
 
1. See, e.g., Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1876) (characterizing 
patents as “[p]rivate property, [which] the Constitution provides, shall not 
be taken for public use without just compensation . . .”); McClurg v. 
Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) (referring to patent protections as 
“rights” when holding that Congress may not retroactively impair patent 
scope granted under a prior statute); McKeever v. United States 
(McKeever’s Case), 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 420–22 (Ct. Cl. 1878) (“[T]he framers of 
the Constitution designed to place the work of the inventor among legal 
rights, which . . . should become property in the eye of the law and be 
respected as such by the government as by the citizen.”). Professor Mossoff 
notes that McKeever’s failure to distinguish between common-law rights and 
statutory rights may be “more the result of hyperbolic rhetoric and late-
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Patents, Public Franchises, and Constitutional Property Interests 
888 
though, the Supreme Court has not definitively held that eminent 
domain protections apply to patents. 2  Several recent developments 
suggest that the issue is newly relevant. Despite holding that patents 
are a “public franchise” that can be revoked in a non-Article III 
proceeding, the Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States Energy Services 
v. Greene’s Energy Group3 (“Oil States”) left open the possibility that 
patents may be constitutional property interests under the Takings and 
Due Process Clauses. 4  Further, the Court’s holding in Impression 
Products v. Lexmark International 5 —that patented products sold 
abroad have their patent rights exhausted6—has raised new legal argu–
ments in the pharmaceutical industry that federal import of patented 
drugs sold abroad could amount to a taking without just compensation.7 
In the scholarly literature, much of the Takings Clause and patents 
analysis centers around whether patents should be classified as private 
property rights on par with real property or whether they are more like 
regulatory entitlements, in the form of a “public franchise.”8 I review 
that scholarship in Part II(A). Lacking in the commentary, though, is 
an in-depth analysis regarding the difference between protecting 
patents with the Due Process Clause and protecting patents with the 
Takings Clause. Indeed, much of the existing scholarship must be re-
 
nineteenth-century judicial formalism than of substantive patent and 
constitutional doctrine.” Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private 
Property: The Historical Protection of Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 
B.U. L. Rev. 689, 707 (2007). 
2. See Christopher S. Storm, Federal Patent Takings, 2 J. Bus. Entre–
preneurship & L. 1, 2 (2008) (“Although the Patents Clause and the 
Takings Clause have coexisted for over two hundred years, the Supreme 
Court has never fully explained the relationship between patent law and 
takings law.”). 
3. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
4. Id. at 1379 (“[O]ur decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that 
patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the 
Takings Clause.”). 
5. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
6. Id. at 1529. 
7. See Frederick M. Abbott, Legislative and Regulatory Takings of Intellectual 
Property: Early Stage Intervention Against a New Jurisprudential Virus 2–
3 (Jan. 4, 2019) (unpublished article), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3346134 (explaining post-Impression Products reactions 
in the pharmaceutical industry). 
8. See Adam Mossoff, Statutes, Common Law Rights, and the Mistaken 
Classification of Patents as Public Rights, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 2591, 2594 
(2019) (describing the debate between private and public rights in the 
scholarly literature and in cases). 
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evaluated in light of the Supreme Court’s treatment of patents in Oil 
States.9 
In this Note, I argue that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause 
protection because of their post-Oil States status as “public 
franchises.”10 Nevertheless, patents are likely protected interests for 
purposes of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.11 Part II(B) analyzes the Oil States opinion, examines 
public franchises in another context, and reviews several of the relevant 
cases that the Court cited in Oil States. In Part III, I analyze 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,12 the Supreme Court’s only Takings 
Clause case that deals with intellectual property, to see how it may 
influence the Court in a future patent case. Part IV reviews how the 
Takings Clause has been applied to patents in lower courts. 
I also argue here that patents are entitled to Due Process Clause 
protection after the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank13 (“Florida Pre–
paid”). Thus, the adequacy of the remedy available for deprivation of 
patent interests will be relevant to patent-related due process claims 
against the federal government. I provide background on the currently 
available remedy, 28 U.S.C. § 1498, in Part V. Finally, I argue in Part 
VI that the Takings Clause should not apply to patents because of the 
Oil States categorization of patents as public franchises, and I introduce 
some of the arguments that parties may make in future litigation over 
these issues. 
II. Background: Patents as Public Franchises 
This Part first reviews the status of the legal and scholarly 
commentary regarding patents and their protection under the Fifth 
Amendment.14 Then, I analyze the Oil States decision and its “public 
 
9. See Adam Mossoff, Institutional Design in Patent Law: Private Property 
Rights or Regulatory Entitlement, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 921, 942–43 (2019) 
(arguing that Oil States exhibits a “radical shift” in patent jurisprudence 
away from private property rights). 
10. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018) (“Patents convey only a specific form of property 
right—a public franchise.”). 
11. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (opining that patents “are surely included within 
the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due 
process of law”). 
12. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
13. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
14. See infra Part II(A). 
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franchise” approach to understanding the patent right. 15  With the 
public-franchise approach established, this Part will review some of the 
scant case law on the subject of public franchises in other contexts to 
understand how the public-franchise approach may affect a future 
Takings Clause claim for patents.16 Then, I analyze the cases the Oil 
States opinion cites to narrow its holding—Florida Prepaid and James 
v. Campbell17—by stipulating that it does not address whether patents 
are property rights protected by the Due Process and Takings Clauses.18 
A. Scholarship on Patents as Constitutional Property 
The jurisprudence19 and legal commentary20 that consider whether 
patents are property entitled to Takings Clause protection leave the 
answer mired in uncertainty.21 As an initial matter, patents must be 
considered private property before Takings Clause protection can 
 
15. See infra Part II(B). 
16. See infra Part II(B)(1). 
17. 104 U.S. 356 (1881). 
18. See infra Part II(B)(2)–(3). 
19. Compare Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (holding that patents are a “creature of federal law” and that the 
Tucker Act thus gave no jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims to hear 
claims alleging a patent taking under the Fifth Amendment), vacated, 672 
F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (expressing no opinion on the status 
of patents as property on rehearing en banc), with Oil States Energy Servs., 
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (“[O]ur 
decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not 
property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or Takings Clause.”). 
20. Compare Justin Torres, The Government Giveth, and the Government 
Taketh Away: Patents, Takings, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 63 N.Y.U. Ann. 
Surv. Am. Law 315, 316 (2007) (arguing that patents are subject to the 
Takings Clause), with Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property is Created Equal: 
Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and 
Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 3 (2007) 
(arguing that patents should not be subject to the Takings Clause). 
21. In the first instance, it is not immediately apparent that patents—as 
intellectual “property”—could even be “property” for Fifth Amendment 
purposes. The Court has tended to hold, however, that non-tangible 
interests are “property.” See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1003 (1984) (“It is conceivable that [the term ‘property’ in the Taking 
Clause] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing 
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the 
other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote 
the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, 
as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the 
construction given the phrase has been the latter.”) (quoting United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945)). 
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adhere.22 Further complicating the picture is the frequent invocation of 
Takings Clause language when describing cases of federal government 
infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 149823 or in nineteenth-century case 
law,24 both of which would appear to resolve the issue in favor of private 
property protection. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also 
repeatedly referred to patent rights as dependent on statutory grants—
meaning the statutes create rights which did not exist at common law, 
evoking a public franchise or non-private-property solution.25 Justice 
Thomas adopted this view in his Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz26 
dissent, pushing back on the movement to create stronger private 
property protections in patents.27 
 
22. U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001 (calling it a 
“basic axiom” that property interests under the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause are determined by independent sources of law outside the Cons–
titution); Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1212–13 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a Takings Clause claimant must first 
establish a property interest that the Takings Clause can protect); Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (arguing that the Court 
looks to understandings of property independent of the Constitution to decide 
which interests are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); 
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical 
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689, 700 
(2007) (explaining that patents must be “property” before patent owners can 
bring suit). 
23. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The patentee takes his patent . . . subject to the 
government’s eminent domain rights to obtain what it needs from manu–
facturers . . . . The government has graciously consented [in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498] to be sued . . . for reasonable and entire compensation . . . .”); 
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (explaining 
that eminent domain is the basis for a suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1498); Irving 
Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (same). 
24. See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881) (arguing in dicta 
that a government user of a patent must grant the patentee “just compen–
sation” in the same way that the government must compensate for its use 
of private land). 
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (“[T]he right of 
property which a patentee has in his invention . . . is derived altogether 
from . . . statutory provisions . . . .”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of 
Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent monopoly was not designed 
to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.”); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964) (“Patent rights 
exist only by virtue of statute.”). 
26. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
27. Id. at 848 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no “core” 
property right in a patent because the patent’s scope depends entirely on 
statutory grant). 
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But despite these cases, the nature of patents—as private property 
rights versus public franchises—has been the subject of much academic 
debate, a debate which Oil States appears to have resolved in large 
part.28 Unfortunately, the distinction is not only unclear in the case law, 
but it also involves competing meanings of “rights,” “privileges,” and 
“franchises.”29 Generally, though, a public franchise is a grant of rights 
involving “means to carry out public ends,” existing only to promote 
those ends.30 A true private property right, on the other hand, would 
exist—according to Lockean theory—without political involvement.31 
Many of the competing arguments were raised in briefing before the 
Court for the Oil States case. Perhaps the staunchest proponent of pat–
ents-as-constitutional-property is Professor Adam Mossoff. Professor 
Mossoff, in an amici brief for the Oil States case, sets out arguments for 
protecting patents as typical private property under the Takings Clause 
and the Due Process Clauses.32 He argued that the Court had frequently 
invoked common law property concepts when discussing patents and 
cited real property cases as precedent for defining patent rights. 33 
Additionally, he pointed to the Horne v. Department of Agriculture 
Court’s partial reliance on James v. Campbell for the idea that patents, 
and indeed all personal property, were subject to the Takings Clause,34 
despite the fact that Professor Mossoff has elsewhere argued that the 
Takings Clause portion of James v. Campbell was dicta.35 
Elsewhere, Professor Mossoff has argued that the historical 
treatment of patents in both the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Claims shows that patents were “enthusiastically” protected under the 
Takings Clause.36 “Substantively and rhetorically, nineteenth-century 
courts believed that patents were a species of property.”37 Though the 
historical cases did not all point towards the conclusion that patents 
 
28. See infra Part II(B). 
29. See Mossoff, Statutes, supra note 8, at 2594–99 (describing the differences). 
30. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 
559, 567 (2007). 
31. Id. 
32. Brief of 27 Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, 
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365 (2018) (No. 16-712). 
33. Id. at 6–17. 
34. Id. at 2–3 (citing Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) and 
James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)). 
35. Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708; see also infra text accompanying notes 134–
136. 
36. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 691. 
37. Id. at 701. 
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are constitutionally protected private property, Mossoff argues that the 
arc of the jurisprudence was apparent; “patents were private property 
rights secured under the Constitution.”38 
Proponents of the public franchise approach to patents, on the 
other hand, point out that patents are entirely bound by statutory 
grant and were non-existent at common law.39 Neither did patent rights 
depend on state law.40 Additionally, several amici in Oil States pointed 
out that the role the Executive branch played in granting patents at 
the founding indicates that patents are closer to public rights than 
private ones.41 Further, because patents derive all their boundaries from 
positive statutory law rather than common law, some amici argued that 
adjudicating them in an Article I proceeding would be appropriate.42 
Patents are also subject to maintenance fees, which amici argued were 
for the “privilege of keeping patent rights”—yet another analogy to a 
public monopoly granted as a privilege, not as of right.43 Finally, amici 
argued that land analogies were inapt, because the closest examples 
were leases on federal public land; such leases are subject to admin–
istrative cancelling, much like patents may be revoked in inter partes 
review.44 
Patents-as-constitutional-property skeptics also take issue with pro-
constitutional-property historical claims as to patent treatment. 
Contrary to Professor Mossoff’s understanding that early court 
treatment of patents under the Takings Clause is persuasive, Professor 
Thomas Cotter argues that most, if not all, of these early statements 
about patents can be classified as dicta.45 
 
38. Id. at 710–11. 
39. Brief for 72 Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 3, 6, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-
712). 
40. Id. at 4. 
41. Brief of the Internet Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 6, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712). 
42. Id. at 8. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 10. Federal leases are also limited in time and subject to admin–
istrative payments, as patents are limited in time and require maintenance 
fees. Id. 
45. See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate 
the Fifth Amendment?, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 529, 543 (1998) (“The difficulty 
lies in determining whether to take at face value the Court’s charac–
terization, in James and subsequent cases, of unauthorized government uses 
of patents as takings.”). Though Professor Cotter is among the scholars 
concerned about the expanding “propertization” of intellectual property 
rights, he does not outright reject the idea that the Takings Clause could 
apply to patents. Id. at 564. Even if the protections do apply, however, 
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Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States the debate has 
remained largely academic and absent from the courts; 46  now, the 
debate over the role of patents as property in takings doctrine is once 
again relevant.47 
B. Patents as a Public Franchise: Oil States 
The pivotal Oil States case involved Oil States’ patent for a method 
of protecting equipment during hydraulic fracturing. 48  Oil States 
brought suit against Greene’s Energy Group for patent infringement; 
as part of its defense, Greene’s Energy petitioned the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) to initiate inter partes review of the patent 
on the grounds that the patent was invalid.49 The PTAB found that 
 
Professor Cotter believes that the cases where this is important will be few 
and far between. Id. at 565. 
46. For criticism of the Oil States decision on various grounds, see generally 
Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: Inter 
Partes Review Under the AIA Undermines the Structural Protections by 
Article III Courts, 19 Fed. Soc’y Rev. 188 (2018). Professor Epstein 
argues that Oil States represents a “comprehensive vision of patent law 
that couples weak property rights with high-level administrative control,” 
involving a right-leaning narrowing of patent rights from Justice Thomas 
and a left-leaning empowerment of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
from Justice Breyer. Id. at 188. 
47. The Federal Circuit subsequently relied in part on Oil States’s public 
franchise approach to patents in holding that sovereign immunity does 
not apply to inter partes review of patents in some instances. See Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply for inter 
partes review proceedings), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Regents 
of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
(holding that state sovereign immunity did not apply to inter partes 
review proceedings), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 908 (2020).  
48. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1372. 
49. Id. Inter partes review involves reconsidering the validity of a patent. Id. at 
1371. The America Invents Act (“AIA”) introduced inter partes review in 
2012. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2018). 
Any person other than the patentholder may petition and argue to cancel 
patent claims. Id. § 311(a). The only grounds available to challenge validity 
are lack of novelty and obviousness. Id. § 311(b). Review is adversarial; the 
patent owner is entitled to participate and defend validity. Id. § 316. The 
petitioner has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the patent claims are invalid and should not have issued. Id. § 316(e). The 
PTAB, sitting as a three-member panel, conducts the administrative 
review, id. § 316(c), and issues a final decision terminating the proceedings, 
id. § 317. Any dissatisfied party can appeal the Board’s decision to the 
Federal Circuit. Id. § 319. In the Federal Circuit, the Board’s factual 
determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence and legal conclusions 
are reviewed de novo. See Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
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the subject matter of the patents lacked novelty and were thus 
unpatentable.50 As part of its appeal, Oil States argued that the entire 
inter partes review system was unconstitutional, asserting that only an 
Article III court could revoke an issued patent.51 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument by differentiating 
between public franchises and private rights—and held that patents are 
a grant of the former that are subject to post-grant adjudication in an 
Article I proceeding.52 The Oil States dissent, meanwhile, characterized 
patents as “inchoate property” that, if withdrawn by the executive 
branch, could be subject to due process protection.53 One author des–
cribes the split between the Oil States majority and dissenting opinions 
as embodying the academic debate between the “patents-as-cons–
titutional-property” versus the “patents-as-public-franchises” camps.54 
This split is reflected in many of the amici briefs before the Court.55 
For the majority, Justice Thomas noted that the distinction 
between public rights and private rights has not been clear in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.56 He explained that public rights are those that 
arise from interactions between the executive or legislative branch in 
the performance of their constitutional duties.57 Granting a patent thus 
involves public rights because the executive branch, pursuant to its 
Article I authority to grant patents, effectively takes a right from the 
public—the right to practice a given invention—and bestows it upon 
an inventor.58 
Where public rights are involved, Justice Thomas wrote, Congress 
has “significant latitude” to allow non-Article III courts to resolve 
 
50. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1372. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 1373. Justice Thomas’s public-rights approach pulls from his dissent 
in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 342 
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
53. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans v. 
Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813)). Professor Epstein shares this 
view of patents as property rights on par with traditional property rights 
like real property. See Epstein, supra note 46, at 122–23 (2018). 
54. See Greg Reilly, Congress’s Power to Define Patent Rights (2019) 
(forthcoming), https://www.law.msu.edu/ipic/workshop/2019/papers/reilly 
-power-patent-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6PA-6TEK]. 
55. See supra Part II(A). 
56. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. This statement directly conflicts with the 
Court’s opinion in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, where the 
Court called the distinction between public and private rights “well 
established.” 564 U.S. 162, 172 (2011).   
57. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. 
58. Id. 
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issues.59 Inter partes review, then, invokes the public-rights doctrine 
because it deals with the same issue as when the Patent and Trademark 
Office first considers a patent application—whether the invention is 
patentable—which is an issue of granting a public right.60 Further, the 
Court had previously held that other public franchises—such as permits 
to build toll bridges, railroads, and telegraph lines—may be qualified 
by Congress’s right to modify or revoke that franchise.61 Thus, the 
PTAB could constitutionally reconsider the grant of a patent. 
The dissent, meanwhile, rejected the majority’s arguments largely 
on grounds of historical practice,62 but also took issue with character–
izing patents as a mere public franchise. Justice Gorsuch referred to 
patents as “inchoate property”63 that give “as good a title as the farmer 
holds his farm and flock.”64 Patentees are entitled to the patent “as a 
matter of right.”65 Justice Gorsuch also argued that, assuming patents 
were indeed public franchises, these franchises should be treated “quite 
differently from ordinary public franchises” because the Patent Clause 
was meant to give patents more weight than the that given to mere 
monopolies once granted by the English crown; most other non-patent 
public franchises resembled such English monopolies.66 
1. Public Franchises in Other Contexts 
In light of the Oil States approach to patents as public franchises, 
the treatment of other types of public franchises merits discussion for 
comparability. The case law and academic scholarship on public 
franchises is sparse,67 so the cases that Oil States cites are of particular 
importance. Though these cases could be indicative of how the Supreme 
Court may treat takings claims for patents, there were still several 
members of the Court who believed that public franchises in patents 
 
59. Id. The Court held in Stern v. Marshall that “public rights” can be 
adjudicated outside of Article III courts. 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011). 
60. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374. The Court acknowledged that inter partes 
review differs from the grant of a patent because inter partes review occurs 
after the patent issues—but argued that the distinction is irrelevant because 
patent claims are granted explicitly subject to inter partes review. Id. 
61. Id. at 1375. 
62. Id. at 1381–83 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
63. Id. at 1384 (quoting Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813)). 
64. Id. at 1384 (quoting Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1846)). 
65. Id. (quoting James v Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)). 
66. Id. at 1385. 
67. Id. at 1373 (majority opinion) (noting that the Court has not been con–
sistent or definitive about the distinction between public rights and private 
rights). 
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should be treated differently than the typical public franchise. 
Accordingly, the treatment of other public franchises may not be 
dispositive for future cases.68 
One such case, Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States,69 dealt with 
a franchise that Congress granted to the Louisville Bridge Company to 
build and own a bridge across the Ohio river.70 The Secretary of War 
later informed the owners that the bridge did not leave enough width 
at the river for navigation—even though the bridge became wider than 
even the act of Congress had originally prescribed.71 
During litigation over the issue, Louisville Bridge asserted that 
Congress’s grant of the franchise was an “irrevocable franchise,” such 
that requiring Louisville Bridge to remove or alter the structure would 
be a taking without just compensation. 72  The Court disagreed, 
conceiving of the public franchise right as one limited wherever it 
conflicts with the public right—and acts of Congress later limiting the 
franchise are such an instance.73 
If the analogy to bridge franchises holds—particularly on the facts 
present in Louisville Bridge—it would suggest that patents are not 
entitled to Takings Clause protection. One of the strongest cases for 
applying eminent domain jurisprudence to patents would be Congress 
either directly revoking or directly re-assigning a patent, because that 
would entirely deprive the patentee of any interest in the patent.74 In 
Louisville Bridge, though, the Court held that the franchise must yield 
to the will of Congress.75 Though it is not entirely clear that this would 
defeat Takings Clause claims for patents, it certainly gives reason for 
pause. 
In addition to evoking non-patent public franchise doctrine, the Oil 
States Court’s approach to patents as a public right or public franchise 
appears to be a revival of an old approach in the Supreme Court’s 
 
68. See id. at 1385 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
69. 242 U.S. 409 (1917). 
70. Id. at 414. 
71. Id. at 414–15. 
72. Id. at 416. Louisville Bridge further argued that Congress must exercise 
its commerce-clause authority to require the bridge’s removal in the first 
place. Id. 
73. Id. at 417. See also Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470, 480 (1881) 
(“Congress, which alone exercises the legislative power of the government, is 
the constitutional protector of foreign and inter-state commerce. . . . [A]ll 
grants of special privileges, affecting so important a branch of governmental 
power, ought certainly to be strictly construed. . . . Every doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the government.”). 
74. See infra Part V. 
75. Louisville Bridge, 242 U.S. at 417. 
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patent doctrine. The principal case Thomas cites as supporting the 
patents-as-public-franchise approach is Seymour v. Osborne,76 a case 
from 1871.77 In Seymour, the Court referred to patents being “as much 
entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise.”78 
A patent, according to the Seymour Court, is not intended to give the 
owner a “true” monopoly—instead, patents are public franchises 
sanctioned by Congress.79 
The famous case Gayler v. Wilder80 also emphasizes the role that 
Congress plays in the patent regime such that patents are more like 
public rights than private ones, though it does not explicitly invoke 
public franchises. In that case, Chief Justice Taney notes that the 
patent monopoly, such as it is, exists subject to Congress’s regulation.81 
“[The patent monopoly] is created by the act of Congress; and no rights 
can be acquired in it unless authorized by statute, and in the manner 
the statute prescribes.”82 Oil States favorably cites Gayler v. Wilder for 
the idea that “a patent can confer only the rights ‘that the statute 
prescribes.’”83 
 
76. 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1871). 
77. As the Oil States Court notes, public franchise language from Seymour is 
cited favorably in the much more recent Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 
525 U.S. 55, 63–64 (1998). Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy 
Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–74 (2018); see also Crown & Die Tool Co. 
v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923) (citing Chief Justice 
Taney’s public franchise language favorably). 
78. Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533. 
79. Id. 
80. 51 U.S. 477, 493 (1850). 
81. Id. at 494. Though Chief Justice Taney refers to the patent grant as a 
monopoly, this is not necessarily inconsistent with Seymour’s approach. 
In fact, Seymour is best understood as providing that the patent monopoly 
is not absolute—it is subject to congressional limitations. See Seymour, 
78 U.S. at 533. 
82. Gayler, 51 U.S. at 494. This language is cited favorably by the Supreme 
Court much more recently in Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–
64 (1998). Additionally, both Gayler and Pfaff are cited as supporting the 
idea that patents are a public franchise in Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–
74. 
83. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375 (quoting Gayler, 51 U.S. at 494.) Similarly, 
in an early copyright case, the Court noted that copyrights and patent 
rights did not exist at common law, so Congress has wide latitude to tailor 
those rights. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663–64 (1834) (“No one 
can deny that when the legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in 
an author or an inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions 
on which such right shall be enjoyed . . . .”). 
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The Oil States Court thus emphasizes that the only rights conferred 
by public franchises are those given by statute.84 The patent code 
explicitly provides that patents have personal property attributes 
“[s]ubject to the provisions of this title,” and the Title—Title 35—
qualifies the grant of the patent as subject to inter partes review.85 
Thus, the rights conferred by the patent are subject to possible revo–
cation by inter partes review.86 This reflects a longstanding idea that 
the only rights that patentees have are the rights Congress confers.87 
Though the public franchise language may appear to answer 
questions about the property rights conferred by patents, the Oil States 
opinion stipulates that its holding does not implicate the status of 
patents in the eminent domain context.88 Citing Florida Prepaid89 and 
James v. Campbell,90 Justice Thomas writes that “our decision should 
not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”91 This 
statement may simply clarify the limitations of the Court’s holding 
rather than suggest that patents are indeed property rights for takings 
doctrine purposes. Justice Thomas’ choice in cited precedent, however, 
suggests that the Court may be sympathetic to the claim.92 
2. Florida Prepaid 
The Oil States opinion cites Florida Prepaid to support the 
narrowness of the opinion’s reach, particularly as not answering 
 
84. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–74. 
85. Id. at 1375 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018)). 
86. Id. at 1373. 
87. See Motion Pictures Pats. Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
517 (1917) (calling Congress “the source of all rights under patents”); 
Gayler, 51 U.S. at 494 (“[The patent] is created by the act of Congress; and 
no rights can be acquired in it unless authorized by statute, and in the 
manner the statute prescribes.”); Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 592 (“[I]t has never 
been pretended by any one, either in this country or in England, that an 
inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented.”) 
88. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
89. 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999). 
90. 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881). 
91. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
92. The dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch also favorably quotes language 
from a late-1800s case that indicates receptivity to the idea that patents 
have traditional property characteristics—including, apparently, the right 
to compensation in eminent domain actions against patents. Id. at 1384 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). “Allowing the Executive to withdraw a 
patent . . . ‘would be to deprive the applicant of his property without due 
process of law . . . .’” Id. (quoting McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. 
Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612. (1898)). 
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whether patents are entitled to Due Process or Takings Clause protec–
tion.93 Florida Prepaid dealt with the constitutionality of Congress’s 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity in patent infringement suits.94 
In 1999, Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to “clarify that 
States . . . are subject to suit in Federal court by any person for 
infringement of patents.”95 
Prior to the Patent Remedy Act, the Federal Circuit had declined 
to interpret the patent code, by itself, as an abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity for patent claims.96 After the Patent Remedy Act’s 
adoption, however, a new avenue for suit against state entities was 
available. One such suit came from College Savings Bank. College 
Savings held a patent for its financing methodology of college tuition 
funds.97 The bank brought a patent infringement suit against Florida 
Prepaid—a subsidiary of the Florida government—which ran a similar 
tuition savings program.98 
Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss the action on the basis that it 
enjoyed sovereign immunity from patent infringement lawsuits, arguing 
that Congress had failed to validly abrogate this immunity in the 
Patent Remedy Act.99 College Savings, on the other hand, rested its 
argument on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives 
 
93. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379 (citing Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999)). In the recent case 
Allen v. Cooper, oral argument frequently turned to whether Florida Prepaid 
must be overruled in a case involving a waiver of sovereign immunity for 
copyright infringement. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Allen v. 
Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2019) (No. 18-887). Petitioner also argued that the 
Takings Clause could serve as a basis for Congress’s abrogation of sovereign 
immunity, which could also apply to patents and overrule Florida Prepaid 
on other grounds. Id. at 17–18. Petitioner repeatedly referred to copyrights 
as “private property rights,” and discussed patents. Id. at 16. Justice Alito 
asked specifically about takings. Id. at 44. That could serve as a starting 
point for patent infringement and takings cases. 
94. 527 U.S. at 630 (1999). 
95. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. 
102-560, preamble, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992). Congress adopted this act in 
response to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 
331, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1989), where the court held that the patent laws as they 
stood did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Florida 
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632. 
96. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632. 
97. Id. at 630–31. 
98. Id. at 631. 
99. Id. at 633. This argument stems from the decision in Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, where the Court held that Congress had not validly 
abrogated state sovereign immunity as to suit by Native American tribes. 
517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). 
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Congress the authority to enforce the Due Process Clause.100 Here, that 
meant that Congress could validly abrogate sovereign immunity to 
protect patents—so long as patents were protectable property interests 
under the Due Process Clause.101 
The district court denied Florida Prepaid’s motion to dismiss,102 
and the Federal Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Congress had 
clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity and 
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress that 
power. 103  The Federal Circuit further reasoned that patents are 
property entitled to Due Process protection, so Congress may legislate 
to protect the property rights of patentholders—waiving state sovereign 
immunity being one way to do so.104 
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed. Congress had, in part, 
rested its authority to enact the Patent Remedy Act on its Article I 
powers, either through the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause.105 
The Supreme Court noted that Congress’s Article I powers are insu–
fficient to waive state sovereign immunity under any circumstances 
after its ruling in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,106 and further 
found that the remedy provided by the Patent Remedy Act exceeds 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority because the record was 
insufficient to support the broad waiver of immunity.107 According to 
the Court’s City of Boerne v. Flores108 precedent, remedial legislation 
that seeks to vindicate Fourteenth Amendment interests must identify 
an “evil” or “wrong.”109 Though Congress had identified a wrong—
patent infringement by states without remedy due to sovereign 
immunity—the record before Congress showed little to no indication 
that state infringement was actually a problem worthy of federal 
intervention.110 
 
100. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633. 
101. Id. 
102. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. 
Supp. 400, 401 (D.N.J. 1996). 
103. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 
1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
104. Id. at 1348–50. 
105. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–36. 
106. 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996). 
107. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–37, 639–40. 
108. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
109. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530, 
532). 
110. Id. at 640–41. Indeed, the bill’s sponsor explicitly stated that there was no 
evidence at all of a widespread state infringement issue. Id. at 641. The House 
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Though the Court appeared to have dispensed with the broad 
waiver of sovereign immunity, College Savings also argued that when a 
state infringes a patent and then claims sovereign immunity from suit, 
that state takes the patentee’s property without just compensation.111 
Florida Prepaid asserted that patents are property interests created 
under Congress’s Article I powers and that Congress may not create a 
property right and then invoke Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to protect that same right.112 
The Court declined to analyze College Savings’ Takings Clause 
claim because Congress had not identified the Fifth Amendment as 
grounds for its authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity.113 The 
Court did, however, agree that College Savings might have recourse 
through due process. The Court opined that “[p]atents . . . have long 
been considered a species of property.”114 Because patents are property, 
the Court noted that the Due Process Clause protects them from State 
deprivation without due process of law.115 “[I]f the Due Process Clause 
protects patents, we know of no reason why Congress might not 
legislate against their deprivation without due process under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”116  
Report identified only two total patent infringement suits against states. Id. 
at 640. This put the Patent Remedy Act in stark contrast with the sort of 
remedial legislation upheld in City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525–27, where 
there was a “pattern of constitutional violations” and an “undisputed record 
of racial discrimination” in the context of voting rights. Florida Prepaid, 527 
U.S. at 640; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 315–
16, 333–34 (detailing a pattern of racial discrimination that justified remedial 
legislation). 
111. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641. It is interesting to note that the United 
States declined to defend the Patent Remedy Act on Takings Clause grounds 
but did agree with College Savings that Due Process Clause interests were 
at stake. Id. at 642. 
112. Id. at 642. 
113. Id. at 642 n.7 (“There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself, 
or in the House or Senate Reports of the bill which became the statute, that 
Congress had in mind the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend–
ment. Since Congress was so explicit about invoking its authority under 
Article I and its authority to prevent a State from depriving a person of 
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, we 
think this omission precludes consideration of the Just Compensation 
Clause as a basis for the Patent Remedy Act.”). 
114. Id. at 642. The Court engages in admittedly little analysis of patents as 
property, relying on two 19th-century cases for the proposition. If the Court 
were to take up the question today, the question would likely be complicated 
by the Oil States public franchise approach, which the Florida Prepaid 
Court did not consider. See supra Part II. 
115. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642. 
116. Id. 
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Despite holding that patents may be protected as property under 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Court pointed out 
that a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, by itself, is 
not an unconstitutional act.117 The deprivation must occur without due 
process of law; here, that would occur “only where the State provides 
no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners.”118 
Again, Congress evidenced almost no consideration of the adequacy of 
available state remedies, and the little consideration afforded was 
largely about the inconvenience of state remedies versus federal 
remedies.119 Thus, the legislation did not truly seek to remedy extensive 
deprivations of rights that would justify the use of Section 5 power.120 
With a remedy out of proportion to the problem as evidenced in the 
record, the Patent Remedy Act was not a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority.121 
The Court in Oil States cites the portion of Florida Prepaid that 
refers to patents as “a species of property” that is “surely included 
within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State 
without due process of law.”122 The specific language used in Oil States, 
however, does not make clear whether the Court considers the status 
of patents as property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
settled law—settled in the sense that patents are indeed entitled to 
protection under both amendments—or whether the holding merely 
does not reach that question. “Finally, our decision should not be 
misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes 
of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”123 The ambiguity in 
this sentence suggests that the area is ripe for litigation. It appears, 
though, that Florida Prepaid stands for the proposition that patents 
are property for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due 
 
117. Id. at 642–43 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). 
118. Id. at 643. 
119. Id. at 644. Additionally, the Court noted that negligent government actions 
do not “deprive” a person of their property without Due Process. Id. at 645. 
Patent infringement is a strict liability regime—requiring no knowledge or 
intent, except with respect to damages—and Congress did not adequately 
address evidence suggesting that states were often only negligent, if not 
completely innocent, infringers. Id. 
120. Id. at 646 (“[T]he record at best offers scant support for Congress’s con–
clusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without due 
process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent 
actions.”). 
121. Id. at 645–48 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526, 530–33). 
122. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1379 (2018); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642. 
123. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
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Process Clauses—though that conclusion may be undermined by the 
opinion’s lack of thorough analysis as to the property interest. 
But protection as a property interest for Due Process Clause 
purposes does not guarantee protection as a property interest under the 
Takings Clause.124 Given that the Court in Florida Prepaid explicitly 
refused to consider whether the Takings Clause supported a sovereign 
immunity waiver for patent infringement suit—and thus did not 
consider whether patents are property for Takings Clause purposes125—
the Oil States opinion was likely relying on Florida Prepaid for the idea 
that patents are protectable interests under the Fourteenth Amend–
ment Due Process Clause. That leaves the Court’s citation to James v. 
Campbell126 as the only support for the idea that patents could be 
protected by the Takings Clause. 
3. James v. Campbell 
In addition to citing Florida Prepaid as suggesting that patents are 
property under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Oil States majority 
cites to James v. Campbell, likely for the proposition that patents are 
potentially deserving of Takings Clause protection. 127  In that case, 
Campbell sued to enjoin the Post Office from using Campbell’s 
patented letter-stamping technology.128 The Supreme Court’s opinion 
opens with language strongly evoking eminent domain jurisprudence: 
That the government of the United States when it grants letters-
patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon 
the patentee an exclusive property [right] which cannot be 
appropriated or used by the government itself, without just 
compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without 
compensation land which has been patented to a private pur–
chaser, we have no doubt.129 
The Court also notes that many inventions deal with goods that 
only a government may use—primarily weapons of war.130 The United 
 
124. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 701 (“Identifying patents as property was 
necessary in securing [patents] under the Takings Clause, but it was not 
sufficient.”). 
125. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
126. 104 U.S. 356 (1881). 
127.  Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379 (citing Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358).  
128. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357. 
129. Id. at 357–58 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. at 358. “If [the government] could use such inventions without compen–
sation, the inventors could get no return at all for their discoveries and 
experiments.” Id. This statement still holds some weight today. See Cotter, 
supra note 45, at 556 (“The most obvious scenario under which a government 
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States Government, unlike the English crown, did not reserve a right 
to infringe patents as a matter of prerogative. 131  Though the 
government may “take” a patent when it infringes,132 the Campbell 
Court writes that that does not conclude the case; there must be a court 
with jurisdiction to vindicate the constitutional right to “just compen–
sation.”133 
Relying on Campbell to support the patents-as-constitutional-
property for Takings Clause purposes is likely to hold little water; this 
part of the opinion was not part of its holding.134 Professor Mossoff 
argues that this section was dicta, even though future cases and 
commentators assumed that it was part of the holding, because the 
Court resolved the case entirely on other grounds.135 The Court did not 
have to reach the issue of damages for patent infringement—indeed, the 
Court did not even reach the question of whether the Court of Claims 
had jurisdiction—because the Court merely found the patent invalid.136 
Further complicating the Takings Clause approach to patents is the 
Supreme Court’s citation to Campbell in Horne v. Department of 
Agriculture,137 where the Court held that personal property is entitled 
to Takings Clause protection.138 To support that argument, the Court  
use of intellectual property is likely to eliminate the property’s value to its 
owner is when the government is the only potential purchaser of the right to 
use the property—such as might be the case, for example, with regard to a 
patented invention that is useful only for military purposes.”). 
131. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358. 
132. See infra Part IV for a discussion of whether the court is right to charac–
terize all patent infringements as takings. 
133. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358–59. Congress later provided an avenue for remedy 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1498. See infra Part V. Campbell considered this question 
before the Court seemingly held that the Takings Clause is a self-executing 
waiver of sovereign immunity. See First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987) 
(rejecting the argument that the Fifth Amendment alone does not waive 
sovereign immunity because “it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy 
for interference with property rights amounting to a taking”). There is 
currently a circuit split as to whether the Takings Clause is truly self-
executing, with two circuits holding that it is self-executing, and at least 
one circuit holding that it is not. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 
Sammons v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1325 (2018) (mem), denying cert. to 
860 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-795) (describing the circuit split). 
134. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357–59. 
135. Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708 (“Since the Supreme Court resolved James 
v. Campbell on the issue of the patent’s validity, it addressed only as dicta 
whether patents were secured under the Takings Clause.”). 
136. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 359, 383; see also Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708. 
137. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
138. Id. at 2431. 
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quoted James v. Campbell for the idea that a patent—as personal 
property—could not be used by the government without just 
compensation.139 This statement from Campbell, though, was still dicta 
with respect to patents as private property entitled to Takings Clause 
protection;140 thus, the Horne Court’s reliance on it does not create 
much certainty as to patents. 
III. Comparison to Trade Secrets:             
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Though the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether patents 
are entitled to Takings Clause protection, the Court has granted such 
Fifth Amendment protection to another form of intellectual property—
trade secrets—in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.141 In light of Ruckel–
shaus, any argument that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause 
protection will have to overcome comparisons to trade secrets.142 
Ruckelshaus dealt with the constitutionality of several provisions of 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”),143 
which required that all pesticides be registered with EPA.144 Subsequent 
amendments to FIFRA, originally enacted in 1947,145 dealt with the 
public disclosure of information the applicant turned over during the 
registration process.146 Though applicants could designate some types 
of information on applications as trade secrets or similarly sensitive 
information in an attempt to protect it from public disclosure under an 
early version of the law,147 the statute left EPA to use its judgment 
about what to protect from public disclosure.148 EPA could disagree 
with the applicant’s designation and propose to disclose it anyway.149 
Another provision of the law allowed for subsequent applicants to 
rely on data submitted by earlier applicants if the subsequent applicant 
 
139. Id. at 2427. 
140. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708. 
141. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
142. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Court compared and contrasted 
patents with trade secrets when analyzing whether federal patent laws 
preempted state trade secret laws that could have covered similar subject 
matters. 416 U.S. 470, 480–83 (1974). 
143. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 990 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1978)). 
144. Id. at 991. 
145. Id. 




Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Patents, Public Franchises, and Constitutional Property Interests 
907 
offered to compensate the earlier applicant.150 This amounted to a 
mandatory license.151 Later amendments granted first applicants a 10-
year exclusivity period, after which subsequent applicants could use the 
data for five years, subject to agreement on compensation or by non-
reviewable binding arbitration.152 Finally, Congress amended FIFRA to 
require disclosure of all health, safety, and environmental data to 
“qualified requesters,” not subject to the non-disclosure of trade secrets 
under the statute.153 
Monsanto disclosed such health and environmental data in an 
application for pesticide registration.154 Monsanto sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief against FIFRA’s data-disclosure provisions, alleging 
that they amounted to a taking of Monsanto’s property without just 
compensation.155 
The Supreme Court first noted that the nature of trade secrets 
meant that any property interest would be extinguished if the 
individual had publicly disclosed that information.156 Next, the Court 
compared trade secrets to more traditional forms of property.157 Trade 
secrets—like traditional property—can be assigned, form the res of a 
trust, and pass to a bankruptcy trustee.158 The Court admitted that the 
intangibility of trade secrets could complicate the analysis, but noted 
that the Court had in the past interpreted the Takings Clause as 
protecting other types of intangible interests—including liens and 
contracts.159 
Lastly, the Court argued that intangible property rights protected 
by state law deserve Takings Clause protection.160 Because of the “basic 
axiom”161 that property interests under the Takings Clause come from 




152. Id. at 994–95. 
153. Id. at 995–96. 
154. Id. at 998. 
155. Id. at 998–99. 
156. Id. at 1002. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 1003. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 1001. 
162. Id. (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 
161 (1980)). 
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much of the fact that trade secrets are protected by Missouri law163—
the state of Monsanto’s headquarters.164 The Court thus held that trade 
secrets like Monsanto’s are a property right secured by the Takings 
Clause.165 
Holding that trade secrets are property interests under the Takings 
Clause did not end the matter. The Court then analyzed whether a 
“taking” occurred when EPA disclosed Monsanto’s data or used it to 
evaluate another party’s application.166 The Court applied its typical 
factors for takings analyses; “the character of the government action, 
its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations.” 167  For Ruckelshaus, the Court focused on 
“reasonable investment-backed expectations” because that factor 
weighed so heavily against a taking so as to foreclose further analysis.168 
With some complication based on the date of the submitted data, 
the Court held that Monsanto lacked any reasonable investment-backed 
expectation in much of the data because Monsanto was aware, when it 
submitted its data, that the EPA could publish it.169 “[A] voluntary 
submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic 
advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.”170 The Court 
also considered whether using the data for other parties’ applications 
was a “public use” in its eminent domain jurisprudence, but refused to 
conclude that the publication provisions lacked a public use merely 
because other private organizations would benefit.171 Congress believed 
that there was a substantial public benefit in the form of streamlined 
registrations and greater competition in the market, so it was within 
Congress’s authority to regulate.172 
Then, the Court analyzed Monsanto’s plea for injunctive relief. The 
Court pointed out that such equitable relief is not available for takings 
claims when there is a claim for just compensation available.173 Further, 
 
163. Id. at 1003–04. 
164. Id. at 997. 
165. Id. at 1003–04. 
166. Id. at 1004. 
167. Id. at 1005 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 
(1980)). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 1006–07. 
170. Id. at 1007. 
171. Id. at 1014. 
172. Id. at 1015 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 
(1984)). 
173. Id. at 1016. 
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the Takings Clause does not require that the compensation come before 
the taking,174 so aggrieved claimants could simply seek compensation 
under the Tucker Act.175 
Ruckelshaus could be relevant to a Takings Clause analysis for 
patents because of its approach to defining the source of the property 
interest for another form of intellectual property. 176  Though the 
Ruckelshaus Court only mentioned state law as being a source of 
property interests protectable by the Takings Clause, that is not to say 
that there can be no other sources; it is possible that Congress may 
create such an interest by statute, or even that the property interest in 
patents already exists by virtue of the existing patent code.177 
IV. Patents as Constitutional Property Interests         
in Lower Courts 
Though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the 
applicability of the Takings Clause to patents, the Federal Circuit has 
heard such argument before in two notable cases—Celgene Corporation 
v. Peter178 and Zoltek Corporation v. United States.179 
A. Celgene Corporation v. Peter 
Celgene partially involved a challenge to the AIA’s inter partes 
review scheme.180 Celgene’s patent predated the AIA’s enactment, so 
Celgene argued that retroactively reconsidering the patent’s validity 
with a later-enacted scheme was an unconstitutional taking.181 The 
Patent Office—the appellee in the case—conceded that patents were 
indeed valid Fifth Amendment property interests.182 Thus, the court did 
no substantive analysis on the issue, quoting only the Fifth Amendment 
and subsequently assuming that patents are valid property interests.183 
The court ultimately held that applying inter partes review to pre-AIA 
 
174. Id. (citing Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932)). 
175. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982) (providing that the Court of 
Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims founded upon the Constitution 
against the United States). 
176. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 698 (explaining how Ruckelshaus can analogize 
to patents). 
177. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 10; Storm, supra note 2, at 8. 
178. 931 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
179. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
180. Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1346. 
181. Id. at 1358. 
182. Id.  
183. Id. 
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patents is constitutional because inter partes review involves re-
examining patent validity in a manner similar to other types of re-
examinations that existed pre-AIA—accordingly patent owners must 
expect that validity could generally be in question.184 
B. Zoltek Corporation v. United States 
Zoltek I was an infringement case based on Lockheed Martin’s 
alleged misuse of Zoltek’s patented technology for manufacturing F-22 
fighter jets on behalf of the federal government.185 Zoltek first brought 
its action under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), but the trial court held that 
Zoltek was barred from doing so under § 1498(c) because the manu–
facture occurred in Japan.186 The trial court then, however, allowed 
Zoltek to amend its claims to allege a taking without just compensation 
under the Tucker Act without relying on the infringement component 
of § 1498.187 
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that infringement claims 
could not be asserted as Fifth Amendment takings claims under the 
Tucker Act.188 One relevant case was Schillinger v. United States,189 
where the Court held that government patent infringement was a tort 
and thus claims based upon government infringement could not be 
heard by the Court of Claims.190 Zoltek had argued that Schillinger had 
been overruled in subsequent cases because they cast § 1498 claims as 
takings claims, such that patent infringement by the federal govern–
ment amounts to the “taking” of a license to use the patent—not a 
mere “tort” as contemplated by Schillinger.191 The court rejected the 
argument that Schillinger was overruled because those cases did not 
even mention the Tucker Act, and because—by allowing suit in the 
Court of Claims for government infringement—28 U.S.C. § 1498 could 
be interpreted as an attempt to give patent holders a remedy without 
disturbing the non-takings framework from Schillinger.192 Finally, the 
court noted that the only rights in patents are defined by independent 
 
184. Id. at 1362–63. 
185. Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek I), 442 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2006).  
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 1350. 
188. Id. The Tucker Act created jurisdiction for certain claims against the United 
States in the Court of Claims. Id.  
189. 155 U.S. 163. 
190. Id. at 169. 
191. Id. at 1351. 
192. Id. at 1352. 
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sources193 and that “patent rights are a creature of federal law,” such 
that § 1498 would have been useless as a sovereign immunity waiver if 
the Fifth Amendment truly authorized a takings claim for government 
infringement.194 
But Zoltek I was not the last word on patent infringement and 
takings. Zoltek sought a transfer of the case to the Northern District of 
Georgia, which the Court of Federal Claims granted.195 On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit determined that the lower court had erred, and that 
part of the lower court’s error stemmed from error in the Zoltek I case—
and so revisited Zoltek I en banc.196 With analysis not relevant to this 
Note, the Federal Circuit reversed its Zoltek I opinion on the grounds 
that Zoltek had adequately alleged infringement under § 1498(a) that 
was not barred by § 1498(c)—which prohibits § 1498 claims when the 
government’s use arises overseas.197 Because the case could be resolved 
on § 1498(a) grounds, the en banc Federal Circuit declared that it 
would reach no opinion on the possibility of a taking by the federal 
government.198 
Thus, even the specialized Federal Circuit does not have a clear 
holding about the applicability of the Takings Clause to patents. 
Though the Zoltek I opinion could be persuasive in its conclusions about 
the Takings Clause and government infringement, the subsequent 
Zoltek II en banc opinion explicitly reserved that question for another 
case.199 
 
193. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)). The Zoltek 
I court also rejected the idea that Ruckelshaus had overruled Schillinger 
because of its endorsement of takings for an intellectual property right, 
given that the Court had not explicitly done so. Id. at 1352 n.3. 
194. Id. at 1352. 
195. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 409, 410–11 (2009). 
196. Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek II), 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(en banc). Initially, the Federal Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, 
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006), but agreed 
to hear it en banc after subsequent lower court decisions in the litigation. 
197. Id. at 1327. Though it was reversed on other grounds, one commentator 
takes issue with the Zoltek I court’s interpretation of Schillinger, given that 
Schillinger was decided on jurisdictional grounds—and now, the Takings 
Clause is a self-executing waiver of sovereign immunity, so no such 
jurisdictional grounds need be present. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 9–10. 
Isaacs still concludes that Zoltek I’s holding was correct in declining to 
protect patents under the Takings Clause. Id. at 5. For criticism of the 
Zoltek I opinion that ultimately reaches the conclusion that patents should 
be protected by the Takings Clause, see generally Torres, supra note 20. 
198. Zoltek II, 672 F.3d at 1327. 
199. See id. 
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C. Christy v. United States 
The Court of Claims recently considered one such case and rejected 
Takings Clause arguments. In Christy v. United States, 200  Christy 
argued that the PTAB’s invalidation of its patent claims for an 
ambient-air-backflushed-filter vacuum in inter partes review was a 
taking of its property without just compensation. 201  This litigation 
presented a different legal challenge to inter partes review than Oil 
States, which focused on Article III and the Seventh Amendment.202 
Christy relied heavily on the Oil States statement that the opinion 
“should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property 
for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”203 The 
Christy court first analyzed Schillinger and Zoltek I and found that, 
though Zoltek I was vacated on other grounds, its Taking Clause 
analysis still stands, and thus that patent rights could not be asserted 
under the Takings Clause pursuant to Schillinger.204 
Then, the Christy court emphasized that the statement in Oil States 
merely defined the scope of the opinion’s holding.205 In fact, the Oil 
States public franchise approach to patent rights encouraged the 
Christy court to find that the Takings Clause was inapplicable to 
patents. 206  Because patents are public franchises, “[they] are not 
equivalent to private rights”—and because they are not private rights, 
they are not property interests under the Takings Clause.207 
V. Adequacy of the Government Infringement 
Remedy: 28 U.S.C. § 1498. 
Patentees arguing that their patent rights were deprived without 
due process of law would likely have the makings of a legitimate claim 
under Florida Prepaid, given that “[I]f the Due Process Clause protects 
patents, we know of no reason why Congress might not legislate against 
 
200. 141 Fed. Cl. 641 (2019). 
201. Id. at 649–50. 
202. See supra Part II(B). 
203. Christy, 141 Fed. Cl. at 659 (quoting Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. 
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018)). 
204. Id. at 658. 
205. Id. at 659. 
206. Id. at 658–60. The court also rejected Christy’s comparison to Horne v. 
Department of Agriculture because patents can be property rights without 
being private property rights. Id. at 660. Further, patents are unlike the 
raisins at issue in Horne because when patent rights are extinguished in inter 
partes review, there is no title pass from the patentee to the government. Id. 
207. Id. 
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their deprivation without due process under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”208 As the Court noted in Florida Prepaid, however, a due 
process analysis does not stop after determining that the property right 
or interest in question is entitled to protection. 209  With state 
infringement in mind, the Court held that the Constitution is only 
violated if the available remedies for such infringement are either non-
existent or generally insufficient.210 In the context of federal government 
infringement, then, the adequacy of the remedy—28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)—
merits analysis for due process claims. In this Section, I provide the 
history of the statute and review its potential shortcomings. The 
statute’s history and shortcomings may be relevant not only for testing 
its adequacy for due process claims, but also because its development 
may be related to how Congress saw the judiciary’s patent takings 
jurisprudence develop.211 
Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper is credited with popularizing 
the adage “[i]t is much easier to apologize than it is to get 
permission.”212 It is fitting, then, that contractors for the Navy infringed 
a patent to build its Freedom class ships rather than seek a license213—
which led the Navy into a court-ordered payment of more than $7  
208. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 642 (1999). 
209. Id. at 642–43. 
210. Id. at 643. 
211. See infra text accompanying notes 236–244. 
212. See Cliff Purington, Chris Butler & Sarah Fister Gale, Built 
to Learn 171 (2003).   
213. See FastShip, LLC v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 700, 709–10 (2019) 
patent rather than infringing. 
213. FastShip, 143 Fed. Cl. at 735 (vacated on other grounds, 968 F.3d 1335). 
Without a requirement that the federal government engage in efforts to 
license a patent before engaging in activity that effectively creates a com–
pulsory license, the 1918 Act appears to violate the United States’ 
international treaty obligations under Article 31 of the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (“TRIPS Agreement”). 
See TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
Failure to require ex ante licensing efforts has potentially significant 
consequences. In Hitkansut LLC v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 341 (2019), 
the court ordered the federal government to pay a plaintiff $4,387,899.54 in 
attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and other costs for the government’s 
infringement of his patent. 142 Fed. Cl. at 360–68. This amount is 
staggering when compared to the mere $200,000 that the government was 
ordered to pay for the infringement cause of action itself. Id. at 346. The 
difference between the attorneys’ fees and infringement damages suggests 
that the government could have saved a significant sum of money by 
licensing the patent rather than infringing. 
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million in attorney’s fees and costs.214 The patentee in that case is 
relatively lucky, because for much of the United States’ history, the 
federal government could use a patented invention and claim sovereign 
immunity to avoid liability altogether.215 Though the federal govern–
ment was still considered an infringer,216 aggrieved patentees could 
recover nothing. A patentee’s only true recourse was to seek an act of 
Congress.217 
This inequity led Congress to enact a statutory regime in 1910 to 
allow patentees to recover damages for federal government infringe–
ment.218 Eight years later, Congress amended the statute to include 
indemnity for federal government contractor infringement,219 which is a 
common avenue for infringement. That provision allows an aggrieved 
patentee to recover his “reasonable and entire compensation[,]” 
including attorneys’ fees, whenever the patentee’s invention “is used or 
manufactured by or for the United States.”220 
Missing from the statute is any requirement that the federal 
government attempt to license the invention from the patent holder 
before infringing. Further missing is any mention of injunctive relief221—
 
214. FastShip, 143 Fed. Cl. at 735. 
215. See, e.g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 167–69 (1894) 
(holding that statutes creating the federal claims courts did not waive 
sovereign immunity for infringement actions because they sound in tort, 
which suits are expressly omitted from the Court of Claims’s jurisdiction); 
United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270–72 (1888) (quoting James v. 
Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–59 (1881)) (noting that, unless the Court of 
Claims could exercise jurisdiction over federal government infringement 
actions, a patentee’s only recourse against federal government infringe–
ment would be with Congress). 
216. See Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357–58.  
217. Id. at 359 (“If the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims should not be finally 
sustained, the only remedy against the United States, until Congress 
enlarges the jurisdiction of that court, would be to apply to Congress 
itself.”). 
218. See Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851 (1910) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018)) (“1910 Act”); Crozier v. Fried. 
Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 303 (1912) (“The enactment of 
the [1910 Act], we think, grew out of the operation of the prior statute law 
concerning the right to sue the United States for the act of an officer in 
infringing a patent as interpreted by repeated decisions of this court.”). 
219. See Act of July 1, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-182, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918) 
(amending the 1910 Act). 
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2018). 
221. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(noting that injunctions, while available in ordinary infringement cases 
under 35 US.C. § 283, are not available for actions against the federal 
government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
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often called “the only remedy adequate” to protect the patentee’s right 
to exclude222—which converts the statute into a compulsory license.223 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 provides that Congress shall have the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”224 This “exclusive Right” has long 
been understood to be exclusive of not only a patentee’s fellow citizens, 
but also of the federal government itself. The Court in James v. 
Campbell noted that the federal government is bound by the 
Constitution in the same way that private citizens are bound.225 That 
makes the United States unlike England, where the government 
retained an interest in granted patents.226 “The United States has no 
such prerogative . . . by which it can reserve to itself, either expressly 
or by implication, a superior dominion and use in that which it grants 
by letters-patent to those who entitle themselves to such grants.”227 
Though this language has subsequently been understood as dicta,228 
recognizing that the federal government was still considered an infringer 
likely influenced later developments with respect to § 1498. 
The federal government may not have reserved a right to practice 
patented technology, but recognizing the government as an infringer 
was largely useless—Congress had not waived federal sovereign immun–
ity for patent infringement, leaving patentees without a remedy.229 Even 
the Tucker Act of 1887, 230  in which Congress waived sovereign 
 
222. See Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1042 (1964). 
223. See Craig A. Nard, The Law of Patents 354 (4th ed. 2017) (explaining 
that the lack of injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 “means that, as a 
practical matter, the government can indirectly invoke a compulsory 
license.”). 
224. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
225. 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1881) (“That the government of the United States 
when it grants letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, 
confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention 
which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without 
just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without 
compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have 
no doubt.”); see also United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270–272 (1888) 
(affirming the Campbell approach). 
226. Id. at 358. 
227. Id. 
228. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 709. 
229. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358–59. 
230. 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2018)). 
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immunity as to some claims against the federal government,231 provided 
no relief for patentholders. The Supreme Court in Schillinger v. United 
States232 held that the Tucker Act did not waive sovereign immunity as 
to government patent infringement because the Act explicitly set aside 
“cases sounding in tort.”233 Schillinger conceived of infringement claims 
as tortious in nature because patentees seek recovery for damages for 
wrongful acts, as opposed to contractual claims involving a meeting of 
the minds.234 Had the claims been contractual, the Tucker Act would 
grant jurisdiction over those issues to the Court of Claims.235 The logical 
implication of an infringing entity with sovereign immunity is that 
patentholders had no remedy whatsoever. 
It was this lack of remedy that spurred Congress to pass the 1910 
Act.236 The 1910 Act gave patentholders the right to sue in the Court 
of Claims “whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent 
of the United States shall . . . be used by the United States without 
license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use the same, such owner 
may recover reasonable compensation . . . .”237 It is interesting to note 
that this remedy came after Schillinger, because it leads to debate over 
whether the 1910 Act was meant to overturn the Schillinger holding 
that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause protection or whether 
it was meant to provide a completely alternative remedy.238 
The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the 1910 Act to apply 
only to the federal government; it did not provide cover for federal 
contractors who infringed a patent in their work.239 This holding gener– 
231. See id. (providing the Court of Claims with jurisdiction over “[a]ll claims 
founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of 
Congress . . . or upon any contract, express or implied . . . in cases not 
sounding in tort.”). 
232. 155 U.S. 163 (1894). 
233. Id. at 168–69. 
234. Id. 
235. 24 Stat. at 505. 
236. See Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 303–04 
(1912) (explaining that the lack of remedy against federal patent infringe–
ment spurred the adoption of the 1910 Act). 
237. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851 (1910) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018)). 
238. See infra notes 244–245 and accompanying text. 
239. See William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int’l Curtis Marine 
Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28, 44–45 (1918) (holding that the 1910 Act did not 
confer upon federal contractors the right to infringe patents on “the assum–
ption that the United States would be ultimately liable for the patent rights 
which the contractors might elect to take”); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (describing the 
William Cramp holding). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Patents, Public Franchises, and Constitutional Property Interests 
917 
ated concern among the Armed Forces that exposing contractors to 
such litigation would harm military interests,240 so Congress amended 
the 1910 Act to include coverage for inventions used or made “by or 
for” the United States.241 The last amendment to the infringement 
statute came in 1949, 242  which codified the section into 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498, its current form. 
Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides for “reasonable and entire com–
pensation” for federal government or federal contractor infringement of 
a patent. It does lack elements typically associated with eminent 
domain jurisprudence—such as a public use requirement 243—which 
could be an issue if the Supreme Court decides that patents are entitled 
to Takings Clause protection. If the Court decides that Florida Prepaid 
is still good law as to patents under the Due Process Clause, though, 
“reasonable and entire compensation” is likely to be an adequate 
remedy.244 
On the other hand, Professor Mossoff argues that Congress 
intended, through 28 U.S.C. § 1498, to grant jurisdiction to the Court 
of Claims to hear patent infringement claims because Congress saw 
government infringement as a taking.245 That means that even if § 1498 
is an adequate remedy for most infringement cases under the Due 
Process Clause, it may be used as evidence of Congress’s intent to adopt 
a takings approach to patents. Mossoff acknowledges, however, that the 
modern view has been that § 1498 is merely a discretionary policy 
decision, not a constitutional mandate.246 
VI. Patents as Public Franchises in Constitutional 
Property Claims 
In Oil States, the majority opinion takes a “public franchise” 
approach to patents, arguing that they are entitled only to the rights 
 
240. See Wood v. Atl. Gulf & Pac. Co., 296 F. 718, 720–21 (D. Ala. 1924) 
(quoting a 1918 letter from Acting Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt 
expressing concern about William Cramp’s implications). 
241. Act of July 1, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-182, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918). 
242. Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 87, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018)). 
243. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1984) (describing 
the “public use” requirement for eminent domain). 
244. See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
245. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 712–13 (arguing that the legislative history to 
§ 1498 clearly establishes Congress’s intent to recognize patents as private 
property). 
246. Id. at 722. 
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conferred by statute. 247  Though the Court expressly reserves the 
question of whether patents are property rights for the Due Process or 
Takings Clauses, the Florida Prepaid precedent strongly suggests that 
the due process question is settled in favor of protection248—but the 
Takings Clause question is far less certain. After all, just because a 
property interest is entitled to protection under either the Due Process 
Clause or the Takings Clause does not mean that it is entitled to 
protection under both.249 The Takings Clause question is still very much 
in doubt, given that the only Supreme Court precedent in that area is 
dicta.250 Thus, the Oil States classification of a patent will likely come 
into play in the Takings Clause analysis. 
If—as Oil States holds—a patent is a public franchise and not a 
traditional personal property right, then it is not clear how the property 
right could rise to the level of “private property.” 251  The Fifth 
Amendment explicitly protects “private property” from taking without 
just compensation; 252 if the patent right is merely a public franchise 
property right, it may not satisfy the “private property” definition.253 
Even if conceived as a property right in the form of a franchise, it is 
axiomatic in Supreme Court jurisprudence that not all property rights 
are entitled to the “full panoply of constitutional remedies.”254 
It is possible, though, that Oil States could be inapplicable where 
government infringement is involved. Justice Thomas argued that inter 
partes review evoked the public rights doctrine specifically because it 
involved reconsidering the patent grant—and when the PTAB first 
considers granting a patent, that involves a public franchise. 255 
 
247. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1375 (2018). 
248.  Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 642 (1999); see also supra text accompanying notes 114–116. 
249. “The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal 
rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should 
have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal 
discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be 
guarded against.” Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 
319 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and 
“Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale. L.J. 333, 337 (1933)). 
250. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708; see also supra text accompanying notes 
134–136. 
251. See Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641, 660 (2019). 
252. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
253. Christy, 141 Fed. Cl. at 660. 
254. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 36. 
255. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1373 (2018); supra text accompanying note 58. 
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Government infringement or other takings-related acts would not meet 
this same criteria. The idea that the only rights in patents—as a public 
franchise—are those granted by statute,256 however, should overcome 
that burden. The only statutory right to a remedy, then, would be the 
existing statutory remedy for infringement—28 U.S.C. § 1498. Alterna–
tively, under the approach that the only rights in patents are those 
conferred by statute, Congress could conceivably stipulate that patents 
are entitled to Takings Clause protection, but Congress has thus far 
evidenced no such intent.257 
If the Takings Clause did apply to patents in any context, 
additional problems arise.258 First, there are several different lenses 
through which courts could analyze a patent takings claim, which 
complicates any attempt to apply the Takings Clause to patents.259 
Government infringement, for example, has sometimes been described 
as the “taking” of a license.260 This approach would broadly expand the 
scope of federal patent infringement jurisprudence, given that every 
instance of government infringement would be a taking. Additionally, 
this may violate the Court’s Penn Central premise; arguing that each 
infringement is the “taking” of a license is analogous to arguing that 
the government has entirely devalued a section of your one parcel of 
land. Given that a patentee in an infringement situation still retains 
the right to exclude others, and simply loses the “parcel” of a license to 
the federal government, the Court could reject arguments about 
infringement involving the taking of a license.261  
256. See supra Part II(B). 
257. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 41–42. 
258. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 720–22 (noting that patentees may not often 
be entitled to Takings Clause protection because patents only provide the 
right to exclude). 
259. See Storm, supra note 2, at 16–20 (proposing a multi-layered framework for 
patent takings). See generally Cotter, supra note 45 (describing an “expan–
sive view,” a “middle view,” and a “narrow view” as to how government 
uses of intellectual property could qualify as takings). 
260. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(describing the United States as a “compulsory, nonexclusive licensee,” 
rather than an “ordinary infringer,” because of its eminent domain auth–
ority). 
261. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) 
(explaining that eminent domain jurisprudence “does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a 
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a 
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses 
[on] . . . the parcel as a whole . . . .”); Cotter, supra note 45, at 563 
(“Most types of intellectual property are strongly nonrivalrous. The 
government’s use of a patent . . . does not prevent the intellectual 
property owner from simultaneously using the work . . . or from licensing 
others to use it . . . . All that the intellectual property owner loses, except 
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The applicability of the Takings Clause would be more complicated, 
however, in forms of “takings” that do not involve infringement.262 
Though 28 U.S.C. § 1498 should suffice to cover situations of actual 
infringement by the federal government or its contractors, it would not 
appear to apply where Congress re-assigned or completely extinguished 
an extant patent outside of the normal scope of the patent code. Such 
actions would be closest to actual physical occupation or entirely 
devaluing land under the Court’s eminent domain jurisprudence. 
Though at least one court has held that there can be no “takings” claim 
for inter partes review cancellation of a patent,263 the question has not 
reached the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court. 
Such Congressional action, though, would not involve a physical 
intrusion, complicating the matter further. 264  Additionally, these 
situations appear analogous to Congress’s authority to cancel other 
public franchises, like bridges, without triggering Takings Clause 
protections.265 
A more likely analogy given the federal government’s infringing 
activity is to regulatory takings. Under this view, patentees would be 
restricted to only making Takings Clause claims when the government 
infringement almost entirely devalues their patent, rather than just 
depriving the patentee of a license.266 This is quite possible—the Court 
in James v. Campbell was explicitly concerned that patentees could be 
entirely deprived of all value in their patents when those patents related 
to inventions that only governments can use.267 
One commentator has argued that applying a regulatory takings 
framework to patents could lead to actions against Congress for passing 
statutes that devalue patents generally—such as making it harder to 
sue for patent infringement. This may also counsel against applying the 
Takings Clause in such a manner.268 
 
in those rare circumstances in which government use destroys virtually all 
of the property’s value, is some licensing revenue.”) (footnote omitted). 
262. See Storm, supra note 2, at 16–20. 
263. See Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641, 658 (2019). 
264. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 721 (“Given its status as intellectual property, 
a patent is nonrivalrous and nonexhaustive in nature. The government’s 
unauthorized use of a patented invention, therefore, lacks the physical 
dispossession that triggers a compensable taking of land.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
265. See supra Part II(B)(1). 
266. See Cotter, supra note 45, at 555 (explaining a “Narrow View” of patent 
takings that would only trigger the Takings Clause if the government’s 
use of it “virtually destroy[s]” the patent’s value). 
267. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1888). 
268. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 2. 
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Leaving aside the Takings Clause still leaves due process claims. 
Again, Florida Prepaid seems to stand for the proposition that patents 
are entitled to due process protection, but that does not necessarily 
mean that patents are also entitled to Takings Clause protection.269 It 
may be possible, however, to challenge Florida Prepaid’s holding that 
patents are entitled to due process protection as property interests, 
given that the Florida Prepaid Court engaged in relatively little 
analysis of the patent right.270 This is a particularly salient point when 
considering the subsequent Oil States decision holding that patents are 
a public franchise restricted entirely by statutory grants.271 
Notwithstanding potential challenges to Florida Prepaid’s patents-
as-constitutional-property holding, any claimant alleging a deprivation 
of due process with respect to federal government infringement on 
patent rights would run into the Florida Prepaid analysis of the ade–
quacy of the available remedy—because mere deprivation of a property 
interest does not mean that the property interest was unconstitutionally 
deprived.272 The remedy available for federal patent infringement, 28 
U.S.C. § 1498, is likely adequate to protect a patentholder’s interest.273 
Under that provision, successful claimants are entitled to their “reason–
able and entire compensation” for federal infringement.274 Though the 
statute lacks some of the traditional Takings Clause burdens on the 
government such as proving a public use,275 and could certainly be 
improved by introduction of ex ante licensing requirements, the 
availability of compensation—which can include attorney’s fees276—will 
likely be held to operate as a sufficient remedy for federal infringement. 
This is true especially because § 1498 covers infringement by federally 
approved contractors, which provides an even broader base of possible 
infringers.277 It is also not clear that the statute would even need to 
 
269. Id. at 36–42 (analyzing cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly and arguing that 
some property rights can be protected by the Due Process Clause but 
not the Takings Clause). 
270. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 642 (1999); see also supra note 114. 
271. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1375 (2018). 
272. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643. 
273. See supra Part V. 
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018). 
275. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (discussing public use 
in the eminent domain context). 
276. See, e.g., Hitkansut LLC v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 341, 355–56 (2019) 
(awarding attorney’s fees as part of “reasonable and entire compensation” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
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provide the same protections as the Takings Clause to satisfy due 
process. 
Any argument that the Takings Clause should not apply to patents 
will have to overcome Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, where the Court held 
that eminent domain jurisprudence could apply to trade secrets.278 
Because the Court found that state law was an adequate source from 
which to draw a property interest under the Takings Clause,279 it is 
possible that the Court could find sufficient property interests created 
in the patent code to entitle patents to Takings Clause protection. Thus 
far, however, Congress has evidenced no such intent to create property 
interests in patents. This, coupled with the Oil States approach to 
patents as entitled only to the rights granted by statute, should mean 
that patents are sufficiently different from trade secrets to merit a 
different outcome for patents. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s approach to patents as public franchises in 
Oil States indicates that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause 
protection, but the Florida Prepaid opinion is likely still valid as 
establishing that patents may be protected by the Due Process clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If patents only receive the 
protections given by statute, then the only remedy available for federal 
patent infringement is 28 U.S.C. § 1498, but Congress could add 
protections by stipulating that patents are property for Takings Clause 
purposes. For due process claims, the available remedy—again, 28 





278. 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984). 
279. Id. at 987 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 161 (1980)). 
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